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COMMENT .....
was levied upon it before, and subject to the excise tax provided for in the
act, in addition to other taxes. But it is perfectly clear that this was not the
legislative purpose or intention, since the act provides that the tax shall be in
lieu of all other taxes except certain excises." The whole statute will be
declared invalid where the constitutional and -unconstitutional provisions are
so connected and interdependent in subject matter, meaning, and purpose as
to preclude the presumption that the Legislature would have passed the one
without the other, but on the contrary justify the conclusion that the Legis-
lature intended them as a whole and would not have enacted a part only.3 0
Statutes relating to taxation are, of course, within this general rule.3 1 Thus
it becomes apparent that even though the intangible tax in Indiana be con-
sidered an excise it must fail in the light of the exemption of intangibles
from the ad valorem tax, since such an exemption in effect renders the ad
valorem tax no longer "uniform and equal".
Furthermore, the minority opinion of the court contends with some merit
that the act should be held void for uncertainty, pointing out several obscure
provisions of the act. The generally accepted view is that where the terms
of an act are so vague as to convey no definite meaning to those whose duty
it is to execute it, ministerially or judicially, it is inoperative.3 2 An act
imposing a tax must, under these rules, be certain, clear, and unambiguous,
especially as to the subject of taxation and the amount of the tax.3 3
In summary then, the two judges concurring in the majority opinion hold
Indiana's intangible tax to be an excise. Three will hold it a property tax, if
Judge Treanor's premise is properly anticipated. May we assume then it is
a property tax, since a majority so hold? If so, then the "uniform and
equal" clause of the Indiana Constitution under the rule of this case has been
reduced to a nullity by virtue of Judge Treanor voting with two other judges
to constitute a majority in favor of the act's constitutionality. Yet only one
judge in fact will have held that "uniform and equal" is without any mean-
ing past that of "equality" in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. We have then the anomalous situation in the instant case of
one judge of the Supreme Court of the state controlling and deciding the
law in his own way. Certainly, the state of the law in Indiana under the
rule of the instant case will be difficult to determine.
CHARLES Z. BOND.
The Gold Clause Decisions
It is a conservative estimate that existing contracts call for payment in
seventy-five billions of gold dollars of a weight forty per cent greater than
30 People v. Hotz (1927), 327 Ill. 433, 158 N. E. 743; Gibson v. Commonwealth
(1925), 209 Ky. 101, 272 S. W. 43; Lawton v. Steele (1890), 119 N. Y. 226, 23 N. E.
878 (Aff. 152 U. S. 133); Lawton Spinning Co. v. Commonwealth (1919), 232 Mass.
28, 121 N. E. 518; Caldwell v. State (1918), 187 Ind. 617, 119 N. E. 999; State v. Bar-
rett (1909), 172 Ind. 169, 87 N. E. 7; Henderson v. State ,(1894), 137 Ind. 552, 36
N. E. 257; State v. Indiana & Ohio Gas & Mining Co. (1889), 120 Ind. 575, 22
N. E. 778.
31 Davis v. Wallace (1922), 257 U. S. 478; Pollock v. Farmers' L. & T. Co.
(1895), 158 U. S. 601; Foster v. College Park (1923), 155 Ga. 174, 117 S. E. 84; In re
Gates (1926), 243 N. Y. 193, 153 N. E. 45.
32 United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry. (1q14), 213 Fed. 169; State v. Ruesswig
(1910), 110 Minn. 473, 126 N. W. 279; Ex parte Alpine (1928), 203 Cal. 731, 265 Pac.
947; Commonwealth v. Florence (1921), 192 Ky. 236, 232 S. W. 369; Jones v. Lawson
(1920), 143 Ark. 83, 220 S. W. 311; Board of Education v. Morgan (1925), 316 IIl.
143, 147 N. E. 34; Drake v. Drake (1833), 15 N. C. 91; Hallman v. Coker (1921), 147
Ark. 226, 226 S. W. 1054.
33 Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. (1926), 287 Pa. 70, 134 Atl.
452; State v. Humble Pipe Line Co. (1923), 112 Tex. 375, 247 S. W. 1082.
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that which the dollar contains today. Three to four billions of dollars in gold
have been demanded annually as interest upon this principal indebtedness.
Small wonder, then, that critics from the press, from the academy of econom-
ics, and from the bar have pronounced the decision of the United States
Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of a Congressional enactment
abrogating gold clauses in private contracts as the most important decision of
a half century. The decision of Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.,' sus-
taining abrogation of a gold clause in a private contract, proceeds upon an
entirely different rationalization than the holding of the Court in the cases of
a gold certificate2 and of a government bond 3 calling for payment in gold.
The cases will be considered separately.
An understanding of the import of these decisions necessarily demands
a knowledge of the legislation from which these conflicts arose and the social
and economic turmoil which inspired that legislation. The United States was
burdened with an indebtedness of two hundred and fifty billions of dollars.4
That indebtedness represents a credit structure founded upon an expectation
of earning power impossible of realization. Partial collapse was imminent.
Forced repudiation, bankruptcy, and all the ills of economic chaos threatened
this nation. It was imperative that social control be introduced through Con-
gressional legislation designed to reduce this indebtedness to a point com-
mensurate with the earning power of our people. With congnizance of these
facts, Congress enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 19335 author-
izing the President to revise the weight of the gold dollar downward to fifty
per cent of its then existing weight of twenty-five and eight-tenths grains.
The social interests which Congress purported to protect by this measure
were set forth as the stabilization of domestic prices and, further, to protect
the foreign commerce from the adverse effects of depreciated foreign cur-
rency. On June 5, 1933, by Joint Resolution of Congress, 6 gold clauses in
private and public contracts were said to be contrary to public policy whether
heretofore or hereafter incorporated in contracts. In an effort to assure
uniform values to the coins and currency of the United States, this act pro-
vided that payment of all contracts calling for amortization in gold should
be dollar for dollar in present legal tender currency. Pursuant to the Gold
Reserve Act of 1934,7 the President set the gold content of the dollar at
fifteen and five-twenty-firsts grains. Additional measures required that all
1 Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., United States v. Bankers' Trust Co. (1935),
55 S. Ct. 407. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of New York
and to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Norman, plaintiff, brought this suit upon a coupon of a bond executed by the Balti-
more & 0. R. Co., demanding the equivalent of gold coins containing 25.8 grains, nine-
tenths fine. The New York Court of Appeals gave judgment for plaintiff in an amount
less than demanded.
In United States v. Bankers' Trust Co., the Trust Co. intervened as trustees under a
mortgage securing bonds issued by the assignor of the petitioner in bankruptcy. The
trustees asked that the income from the property be applied to amortize the mortgage
debt which was payable under the contract in gold coins containing 25.8 grains. The
United States, a creditor of the debtor, intervened with a denial of the legality of the
gold clause contained in the bonds.
2 Nortz v. United States (1935), 55 S. Ct. 428.
3 Perry v. United States (1935), 55 S. Ct. 432.
4 Edie, Principles and Problems of Economics, ch. 25; Fairchild, Furnis and Buck,
Elementary Economics, Vol. 2, ch. 38; Gemmill, Contemporary Economics, Ch. 31;
Taussig, Principles of Economics, Vol. 2, Ch. 35; Report of a Commission on Industrial
Relations for 1915.
548 Stat. 51.
6 48 Stat. 112.
7 48 Stat. 337.
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gold bullion, coins, and gold certificates be delivered into the Treasury.8
All traffic in gold was thereby prohibited.
In Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. 9 the Supreme Court accurately in-
terpreted the contract as an obligation for the payment of money rather than
a commodity contract to be performed by the delivery of gold bullion or gold
coins. Gold clauses have no other purpose than the protection of the obligee
in the event of currency depreciation. Although the case of Bronson v.
Rodes10 interpreted a gold clause as a commodity contract, a later decision in
Treblicock v. Wilson1' recognized that this clause was descriptive of a type
of money. Under either construction of the contract the Joint Resolution
was a taking of property without due process of law unless Congress acted
within the ambit of its delegated powers.
That Congress may emit bills of credit making them legal tender for the
payment of debts was decided in the Legal Tender Cases' 2 and in Julliard v.
Greenman. 13 These decisions overruled the case of Hepburn v. Griswold.14
As a proper and appropriate incident to the express powers of Congress to
regulate the currency and to borrow money on the credit of the United States,
the issue of fiat money was declared constitutional. The Court refused to ex-
tend the character of legal tender to these notes when the contract stipulated
for payment in gold.15 It is to be noticed, however, that both gold and fiat
currency were circulating media having legal tender quality at that time.
Consequently, it was not illegal for parties to stipulate for payment in gold
and those contracts were enforced without hesitation. For this reason those
decisions are not precedents for the validity of gold clauses when they have
been pronounced illegal.
In Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.16 the Court reasoned that the Con-
gressional power to regulate the currency permitted a government monopoly
of gold and the establishment of a managed currency. The syllogistic de-
duction from this major premise gives Congress power to preclude private
individuals from frustrating that policy through gold clauses. A state can-
not usurp that which a sovereign people have delegated to the federal govern-
ment.17 Why, then, should private persons be permitted to alienate the power
of Congress to regulate the value of the currency?
Under a symposium of express powers, including the power to regulate
and establish the monetary structure, Congress constitutionally taxed cur-
rency issued by state banks into oblivion. The social interest was a unifica-
tion of the currency under single parentage. Despite the fact that this pro-
gram invalidated existing contracts, the Court held, in Veazie Bank v.
Fenno,18 that Congress, as an incident to its express powers, could frustrate
contracts which interfere with or are in derogation of these express powers.
Abundant analogies were produced by the majority opinion as instances
of the power of Congress to invalidate the provisions of then existing con-
s 48 Stat. 1.
9 (1935), 55 S. Ct. 407.
10 (1868), 74 U. S. 229; Butler v. Horwitz (1868), 74 U. S. 258; Dewing v. Sears,
(1870), 11 Wall. 379.
'1 (1871), 12 Wall. 687; Gregory v. Morris (1877), 96 U. S. 619.
12 (1870), 12 Wall. 457.
13 (1884), 110 U. S. 421.
'4 (1869), 8 Wall. 603.
15 Treblicock v. Wilson (1884), 110 U. S. 421; Gregory v. Morris (1877), 96 U. S.
619; Dewing v. Sears (1870), 11 Wall. 379; Butler v. Horwitz (1868), 74 U. S. 258;
Bronson v. Rodes (1868), 74 U. S. 229.
'8 (1935), 55 S. Ct 407.
17 McCullough v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheat. 316.
18 (1869), 8 Wall. 533; Ling Su Fan v. United States (1910), 218 U. S. 302.
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tracts which infringed upon the constitutional power to regulate interstate
commerce. 19  Private property was thereby annihilated. In each instance, the
Court determined whether the contract in question interfered with the
exercise of the power of the federal government to regulate commerce.
With the exception of the concurring opinion of Justice Stone, to which
later reference will be made, the Court failed to announce that Congress was
legislating within the domain of the police power. In deference to clarity of
analysis, this implication should have been asserted positively. The police
power of Congress can be exercised only in favor of those special matters
within the embrace of the powers delegated to Congress and then only in
support of a recognized social interest. What were the social interests in
favor of which this body of legislation was enacted?
First, a uniform, managed currency was thought to be necessary to raise
the domestic price level. Second, an indebtedness which overpowered the
earning power of our people demanded reduction in the interest of preserving
the economic and social life of a great debtor class. Third, it is possible that
Congress conceived of a long range scheme of planned economic progress in
which these measures formed an integral part. And, fourth, it is not without
reason to believe that contracts were impaired, paradoxically enough, only to
save them from total destruction by forces beyond the physical power of
government to control.
If this be a correct analysis of the major social interests involved, it
became the duty of the Court to first determine whether these declared in-
terests might be protected through the powers delegated to the federal domain;
and, if so, to ascertain whether these interests overbalance the social value
in security of property and contract (if, indeed, the Congressional measure
was in conflict with security of property and contract). An affirmative
answer would require a further judgment to decide whether the legislation
in controversy sustained these social interests.
Before investigating whether this body of legislation subserved these
social values, a review of the reasoning of the Court in Perry v. United
States20 and in Nortz v. United States21 will determine if the first social
interest has been realized. Both cases involved government contracts calling
for payment in gold dollars containing twenty-five and eight-tenths grains.
A majority of the Court declared that the federal government could not
employ its power to regulate the currency in a manner that would frustrate
the credit of the United States which had been pledged pursuant to the
express power of Congress to borrow money. Therefore, this legislation, in
so far as it attempted to abrogate governmental contracts, was unconstitu-
tional. Having set forth this legal and moral obligation of the government in
robust terms, the Court astutely withdrew all manner of legal remedy.
Upon the theory that a change in the weight of the gold dollar does not con-
stitute a loss to the plaintiff per se, the Court purported to measure the plain-
19 New York v. United States (1922), 257 U. S. 591; Employer's Liability Cases
(1912), 223 U. S. 1; Addyson Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States (1899), 175 U. S. 211.
20 (1935), S. Ct. 432. On certificate from the Court of Claims. Plaintiff brought
suit as owner of an obligation of the United States for $10,000 executed by authority
of an Act of 1917. The Bond provided for amortization in gold coin of the then
"present standard of value." Plaintiff declares the Joint Resolution amounts to a taking
of property without due process of law and is therefore unconstitutional.
21 (1935), 55 S. Ct. 428. On certificate from the Court of Claims. Plaintiff
brought suit as owner of gold certificates of the Treasury of the United States. These
certificates certified that each dollar thereof was supported by a gold dollar deposited in
the United States Treasury. Plaintiff demands an ounce of gold for every $20.67 of
gold certificates tendered. The declaration avers that an ounce of gold bullion is worth
$33.42 in the market. The resulting loss amounts to a deprivation of property without
due process of law under plaintiff's contention.
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tiff's damages for breach of contract by the value of the deprived gold at the
nearest available market for all legal and available uses. Of course, the
market for gold has been abolished by Congressional action, and as a con-
sequence, damages could not be measured. Should specific performance be
given, all that plaintiff could do with his gold coins would be to return them
to the Treasury in return dollar for dollar in currency. The Court of
Claims in which the United States may be sued cannot entertain an action
for nominal damages. 22 Furthermore, under the doctrine of Lynch v.
United States, 23 Congress cannot barter away the immunity of the people of
the United States to suit, that capacity being an attribute of sovereignty.
In the concurring opinion of Justice Stone, before referred to, he ex-
presses the opinion that Congress may denounce the contracts of the United
States through its police power in the regulation of the currency. This
reasoning, although not accepted in so far as the gold clauses are concerned
by the majority opinion of Chief justice Hughes, must have been accepted
by the majority of the Court in sustaining legislation which gave the federal
government a gold monopoly. The very fact that Congress withdrew the
gold in which government contracts were payable manifests an exercise of the
police power of Congress. Although contracts are adversely affected, the
government does not have to pay for injury caused in the exercise of the
police power.24 The economic reason for this position is that embarrassment
would be spared should the United States return to a gold bullion standard
making gold and obligations payable in gold legal; but, at the same time,
stabilizing the dollar on a gold content basis lower than twenty-five and
eight-tenths grains.
The majority opinion in the Perry case intimated that had plaintiff shown
a loss in purchasing power, he might have obtained substantial damages. The
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics report for May, 1934, shows that
the price level in terms of legal tender dollars is only slightly more than
seventy per cent of the price level of 1926 expressed in gold dollars. There-
fore, the creditor is receiving more in purchasing power than he advanced
upon his loan. This datum reveals that the social interest in raising prices
has not been accomplished by this body of legislation. The legislation pro-
ceeded upon the quantity theory of money which ignores the all important
element of the velocity of money and credit.2 5 A fear of continued economic
distress has impaired the velocity of credit as witnessed by the liquid condi-
tion of banks. The failure of prices to rise substantially has, of course,
limited the earning power of our people. The machinery for drastic inflation
is present, nevertheless. Should it be operated intensively, the momentum
of inflation would remove the regulation of currency from social control for
all practical purposes. Managed currency would be a misnomer. Although
price regulation attempted through a controlled currency is constitutional by
reason of their inseparable identity, the first social interest has not reached
fruition.
When this legislation automatically reduced the indebtedness of the
country forty per cent, it was to be hoped that outstanding obligations might
eventually be leveled to meet the earning power of the people. This action
22 Grant v. United States (1868), 7 Wall. 331; Marion & Rye V.' R. Co. v. United
States (1926), 270 U. S. 280.
23 (1934), 292 U. S. 571.
24 When, through a proper exercise of the police power, the performance *of a con,-
tract has been rendered impossible because of illegality, the obligor is excused froin
performance. The intervening illegality constitutes a casual condition subsequent. It is
to be noticed in these cases that the contracts are executory on one side only. Storke,
Monetary Legislation and the Gold Clause (1934), 6 Rocky Mountain L. R. 237.
25 Kilborne, Principles of Money and Banking (1932, 3rd ed.), chapters 4, 5, 9.
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has undoubtedly brought sonie relief to the debtor class, but, as has been
shown, earning power has failed to rise correspondingly. Should debtors
be forced to pay in the equivalent of old gold dollars from an income based
upon the new devalued currency, their condition would be rendered insuf-
ferable. 26 Congress, having the power to devalue the currency, possessed the
ancillary power to enact measures which alone would permit the first named
power to be exercised effectively.
A planned economic progress incorporating a species of the commodity
dollar may be identified with these measures.27 The interdependence of the
supply and demand for commodities with the supply and demand for money
in fixing the price level requires a social control of commodities as well as of
the medium of exchange. This legislation was not sufficiently inclusive to be
fairly said to be more than a pretense at the beginning of a controlled
economy.
It is believed that this legislation impaired contracts only that they might
ultimately be performed in part, at least. The Court necessarily determined
in favor of the less vicious of alternative evils. The huge indebtedness of
this country is the result of unregulated private credit expansion. That in-
debtedness, incapable of amortization, faltered between an imminent danger
of repudiation or a partial reduction under legal sanction. The Court ac-
cepted the more equitable distribution of loss. A representative illustration
will reveal the compulsion of this argument. Ostensibly, the privilege of the
railroads to pay the interest and principal on their bonds in debased currency
is to injure creditors, the more important being insurance companies. In turn,
the small policy holder would be injured. Yet, if the railroads were thrown
into forced liquidation, it is probable that insurance companies could not have
absorbed the loss, and, in consequence thereof, the small creditors of the
country would have sustained disaster. We are of the belief that should
insurance companies fail, the economic structure would be paralyzed. In
short, the intangible property interests of these United States would be
annihilated should the vicious circle of forced liquidation be permitted to
pursue its course without interference.
That property of individuals was destroyed is beyond denial. To contend
that it was taken only as an incident of the monetary policy is a contradiction
of the avowed social interest motivating this legislation. From the opinion
of the four dissenting Justices comes a pronouncement that the monetary
power was the servant of Congress in the destruction of property and the
Fifth Amendment. The salvation of private property was probably the
major objective of both factions of the Court. Under the majority view
private property is sacrificed to save the institution of private property. In
view of this curious fact it is suggested that these decisions demonstrate the
undervision and the inadequacy of the pure, analytical logic which has become
an onerous precedent in legal thinking upon constitutional problems.
JAMEs F. THORNBURG.
26 It has been suggested that creditors incorporate a provision in contracts which
will assure a parity of purchasing power between the amount of money loaned and the
amount to be repaid. In lieu of gold clauses the commodity index would be employed.
Based upon the truthful premise that the real value of money is in purchasing power,
the index would provide a just and accurate standard. Nebolsine, The Gold Clause in
Private Contracts (1933), 42 Yale L. J. 1051.
27 Kilborne, Principles of Money and Banking (1932 3rd ed.), ch. 11; Fairchild
and Compton, Economic Problems (1930 re. ed.), p. 253 ff.
